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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
G. L. HACKETT & COMPANY,
a corporation,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
Case No. 961'3
THOMPSON FLYIN'G
SERVICE OF SAUT LAKE
CITY, INC.
Defendant and Appellant.
RESPONDEN'T'S BRIEF
STATEME'N·T OF THE KIND O'F CASE
This suit seeks damages from defendant for
( 1) Conversion of an airplane, or ('2) Negligently
damaging said ~airplane.
DISPOSITION IN IJOWER COUR'T
This case was tried :to a jury. A verdict and
judgment were entered in favor of plaintiff and
against defendant on plaintiff's Second Cause of
Action (negligence) for the sum of $4,997 .5'5.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant (appellant) ~asks for judgment in its
favor as a matter of law and that failing a new
trial.
1
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent deems it necessary to include a
statement of facts in cthiJs brief because the verdict
of the jury is fully supported by those facts and this
is not apparent from appellant's statement.
'Gary Brimhall (the only witness who testified
in this ,case) is the owner of a single engine Bellanea
Cruise Master airplane (his cause of action for the
destruction of this airplane was assigned to the
plaintiff and respondent). Mr. Brimhall acquired
the ownership of the aircraft in 19'58 ( R. 10) . At
first Mr. Brimhall stored the aircraft at the airport on 211st South Street i'n Salt Lake City, Utah,
but preferred to have the aircraft stored at the Salt
Lake Municipal Airport No. 1, where defendant
maintains its facilities (R. 17). Several months after
he acquired the airp1 ane, he became acquainted with
Mr. Carl Hellberg!, who is the man~aging agent of
defendant. These rtwo had a discussion concerning
the storage of the aircraft in the facilities maintained
by defendant and appellant at Salt Lake Municipal
Airport No. 1.
There was no express agreement between Mr.
Brimhall and the defendant concerning the storage
of the aircraft, and the only evidence of their agreement ils a conversation between Mr. Brimhall and
Mr. Hellberg, as testified to by 'Mr. Brimhall.
1

1 Spelled Hallberg in the record.
2
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Q. "Well, just tell me what you said and what
he said."
A. "The only thing I can remember at all
would be that he said, 'Bring it over and we will
take care of it.' ''

Q. "He said 'Bring it over and we will take
care of it?' That is the substance of what he told
you, is that righit?"

A. "Yes." (R. 18 & 19)
The aircraft was at first stored for some weeks
in a large hangar with other planes ( R. 19) . Defendant also owned and operated a series of hangars
called "'T" hangars, which are so designated because
of their distinctive shape and which can accommodate only one aircraft. Mr. Brimhall had expressed
a desire for a "T" hangar, and some weeks after
his arrangement was made with defendant, he w!as
given a key to a NT" hangar and thereafter parked
his aircraft in it (R. 20).
Subsequently, his airplane was stored in a "T"
hangar owned by a friend. He was, however, billed
for this hangar through appellant and did not know
what arrangements his friend had with Thompson's
(R. 21).

Still later, this hangar was sold and for some
little time thereafter, the aircraft was 'again stored
in the larger hangar with other aircraft ( R. 23) .
3
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Thereafter, No. 1 "T" hangar became available
and Mr. Brimhall stored his aircraft in this hangar.
It was stored in this hangar until removed by defendant without the owner's permission ( R. 16)
to a larger hangar, where it was, on or about the
lst day of February, t961, substantially destroyed
by fire 1(R. 23 & 24).
We, thus see, that during the approxim~ate twoyear period that Mr. Brimhall stored his aircraft
with defendant, it was kept in a large hangar with
other aircraft during two separate intervals, and at
other times in three separate "T" hangars. The stor·age charge remained the same regardless where the
aircraft was stored ( $30 per month ( R. 25) ) . While
stored in the "T" Hangars, Mr. Brimhall was furnished a key by defendant and the hangar door was
customarily locked by Mr. Brimhall (R. 12). While
the aircraft was stored in the large hangar with
other aircraft, it would be parked on the ramp and
stored and removed by defendant's employees (R.
30).
Appellant conceded that it had exclusive control of the airplane at the time of the fire ·(see pretrial order R. 5 & 6). Mr. Brimhall assumed that
the aircraft had been removed from the "T" hangar
to the larger hangar by appellant, because of his
delinquent acc'ount (R. 30). Mr. Brimhall did not
authorize defendant to remove the aircraft from
4
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the "T" hangar to the large h~angar where it was
burned. ( R. 16)
Respondent framed its case in two causes of
action. First, it alleged that the aircraft was, on or
about January 1, 1961, converted by appellant. This
was based on the removal of the aircraft from the
"T" hangar without permission of the owner. In
its second cause of action respondent alleged that
on or about February 1, 1961, the aircraft was negligently destroyed by appellant. This cause was based
on the fact that the aircraft was at the time of the
fire in appellant's large hangar and under its exclusive control.
·The airplane had an agreed value of $8,500
before the fire, and a s·alvage value of $1,250, 'afterward. It was also agreed that defendant was entitled to an :offset of $2,252.'4'5 for sums owing by
Gary Brimhall for storage and service up to the
time of the fire.
The court submitted two verdicts to the jury.
One verdict was based on the theory of conversion,
and the other on the theory of negligence. The difference was in the item for salvage value. If the
aircraft was converted by defendant, plaintiff was
entitled to recover the value of the aircraft less the
setoff. Title would have passed. If the aircraft was
negligently damaged, title would not pass ·and defendant would be entitled to credit for the salvage
5
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value. The jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff and against defendant for the sum of '$4,99 7.55,
based on plaintiff's theory of negligence.
1
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE FACTS SHOW THAT PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED TO RECOVER UNDER EITHER THE THEORY
OF CONVERSION OR THE THEORY OF NEGLIGENCE.

Respondent is entitled to recover from appellant
under e:i:ther the theory of negligence or conversion
and this concept is clear when the course of dealings
between the parties is examined. Particularly their
relationship when the aircraft was removed from
the "'T" hangar 'to the large hangar, where it burned.
For the sum of $30 per month, ~appellant agreed
to store the aircraft. The aircraft was stored in a
large hangar with other aircraft, and stored andremoved by defendant's employees. This gives rise
to a simple bailment contract. These facts !are identical with those of Wyatt vs. Baughman, ·239 Pacific
2d 194 (Utah), wherein it was held that where the
defendant for a consideration agreed to store the aircraft of the plaintiff's a simple contract of bailment
arose.
However, when the aircraft was stored in the
"T" hangar, a different relationship is implied from
the facts. The hangar accommodated only one aircraft; the owner kept the hangar locked and stored
and removed the aircraft himself. Here, the owner
had control of the premises and this distinguishes
the two relationships. While the aircraft was stored
7
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in the "T" hangar; the relatinnship of landlord and
tenant carne into being.
3·2 Am. Jur. Landlord & Tenant Section
2 '·''The relation of landlord and tenant is created by contract, either express or implied,
by the terms of which one person designated
~'tenant" enters in possesssion of the land
under another person known ~as landlord."
The aircraft was converted if 'it was wrongfully removed from the "T" hangar by defendant
(see the lower court's instruction, R. 64). When
the defendant without the permission of the owner
removed the aircraft from the ''T" hangar to the
large hangar over which it had exc'lusive control,
the owners cause of :a-ction for conversion was complete. It was 'assumed by the owner, Mr. Brimhall,
that the aircraft was moved from the "T" hangar
because he was delinquent in his account for storage with appellant (R. 2'7). Appellant offered no
evidence to rebut this testimony.
Appellant, by argument, seeks to justify seizing possession of the ~aircraft on the ground that it
had a landlord lien on the aircraft for its unpaid
storage and repair bill. Assuming that appellant
had such a lien, nothing in our law gives him the
right to seize possession of the tenant's property,
except by following the statutory attachment proceeding 38-3-3 U. C. A. 19·53 (see also 32 Am. Jur.
Landlord & 'Tenant Section 58'3, where it is state·a
8
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in effect that the statutory lien of the landlord musrt
be enforced by Judicial proceedings and that the
landlord has no right to seize the property of the
tenant, and is liable for conversion if he does.)
Thereafter until the fire, 'appellant had exclusive control of the aircraft. A bailment relationship
again came into being because appel'lant was still
storing the aircraft, had control of it, and still claimed its storage charges ·(see 'the answer of appellant
at Record P. '4) . At this point in time, respondent
validly claimed that the appellant was negligent
and the issue was properly submitted 'to the jury.
Appellant contends in substance that respondent cannot rely at the same 1time on both the relationship of landlord and tenant and bailor or bailee
and conversion and negligence, and that respondent
was bound to elect on which theory it would proceed. Appellant's argument assumes that respondent
relied on two theories at the same time. From what
has been shown above, respondent did not rely on
two theories at the same time. 'But r~ther, relied on
successive causes of action based on different relationships existing ·at different periods of time.
Both issues were properly submitted to the jury
and the jury was correctly instructed.
Appellant has attempted to support its argument by reference to the case of United Fire Insurance Co. VIS. Paramount Fur Service, 156 N. E. 2d
1

9
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121 (Ohio). We do not gain the same impression
from reading this case as does the appellant. We
quote from appellant's brief ·at P. 7:
"Plaintiff proceeded against the original
bailee upon the theory of conversion. However, recovery against the bailee was limited
to the sum of $100, that being the ~agreed value
of the cost according to the contract of bailment. Plaintiff then sought to recover against
the sub-bailee upon the theory of negligence.
The court held that having elected to treat
the original bailee as a converter, the owner
·could not take the inconsistent position of
suing the second bailee for loss resulting from
negligence."
~There

is ~ we read the case, nothing in the
decision to indicate that the owner had proceeded
against the original bailee on the theory of conversion, and on the sub-bailee on the theory of negligence. This action was brought against the subbailee only for negligence. From our reading of the
case, it is nowhere stated by the court that the plaintiff had proceeded against the original bailee or for
conversion.

H)
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POINT II.
THE EVIDENCE FULLY SUPPORTS THE VERDICT.

Appellant, under Point II of its argument,
seems to contend ('1) That the relationship of landlord-tenant had not been terminated 'at the time of
the fire, and ( 2) Assuming that the relationship
had terminated, that at most, appellant was merely
a gra;tuitous bailee, and liable only for gross negligence.
It must 'again be borne in mind that appellant
had 'agreed to take care of the aircraft for $30 a
month (R. 19). This was the original bailment contract. Appellant offered no evidence at all, 'and did
not in any manner show that the 'agreement of the
parties had terminated prior to the fire. Indeed,
defendant in its answer (R. 4) states: "That at the
time of the fire mentioned in plaintiff's complaint,
plaintiffs assignor was indebted to defendant for
storage charges on his airplane, and for fuel, lubrication, services, maintenance, and repairs in the
amount of $2,252.45." (Italics supplied) This
amount includes a charge for storage for the month
in which the fire occurred.
Appellant cl'aimed and was given full credit for
this storage and repair bill. It is therefore clear, that
when appellant shortly before the fire acquired possesssion of the aircraft, it did so with expectation of
11
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compensation for storing the aircraft. Under these
facts, the con tract of bailment remained in existence.
Appellant then argues that a bailment relationship did not exist at the time of the fire because
there was no evidence to show that the 30-day }'andlord's lien period had elapsed prior to the fire. We
are given no authority to support the proposition
and cannot see how the fact that appellant had a
statutory lien would prevent it from being a bailee
in this instance. But even further, when appellant
seized possession of the aircraft, he h ad achieved
without legal process all that could be achieved with
it, because our statute merely gave the landlord a
possessory remedy before judgment, 38-3-1 to 8,
UCA 19 53. Appellant in a sense had perfected its
lien and by so doing 'became a bailee of the aircraft.
If we assume that the tenancy had not termin'ated between the date the aircraft was seized
and the date of the fire, this assumption cannot aid
appellant because the duty of care incumbent upon
a landlord that seizes the property of a tenant is
the same as that of a 'bailee, and upon destruction
or dam~age to the property, the same presumption of
negligence arises.
52 C.J.S. Landlord & Tenant, Section 69'5.
" ... Where the property dis trained is injured
while in custody of the landlord, the burden
is on him to re.but the presumption of negligence; but the Jury are to determine whether
1

1
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the landlord's negligence occasioned the injury."
Appellant then argues that if the tenancy had
terminated, it was then only a constructive or gr'atituitous bailee at the time of the fire and therefore,
chargeable only with gross negligence. Appellant
was, however, a compensated bailee, as reference
to the facts and issues before the trial court will
show. Again we repeat, tha:t appellant had agreed
to store the aircraft for $30 per month and this
basic agreement between the parties had never been
terminated. Appellant charged for and claimed this
amount up to and including the time of the fire. Appellant expected compensation for its services and it
m'ay be inferred from the testimony of the owner
of the aircraft, that it was moved to the larger
hangar because appellant was not receiving the expected compensation. Appellant offered no evidence
to the contrary.
Appellant's claim that it was ·at most a gratuitous bailee was never raised in the trial court.
On the contrary, appellant requested the following
instruction which was given verbatim by the trial
court:
Hin connection with plaintiff's second
count, you are instructed tlrat the only duty
upon the part of the defendant, with respect
to the safekeeping of the Brimhall airplane
stored in the defendant's hangar was to exercise reasonable care for said airplane, that is
to say, the same degree of care as would be
13
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exercised by a reasonably prudent person under the same circumstances.
The defendant was not an insurer of the
safety of the Brimhall airplane. By this is
meant that it is not liable merely because such
person'al property was destroyed. It is liable
only if it did some act or thing with reference
to the care of such airplane as an ordinarily
prudent person, similarly situated, would not
have done; or if it failed to do some ·act or
thing with reference to their care which an
ordinarily prudent person, similarly situated,
would have done. In other words, the defendant was required to exercise such ordinary
care and diligence with reference to the care
of said airplane to prevent injury thereto
while under its control, as a person of ordinary prudence would have exercised in caring
for property of the same kind, in the same
situation, 'and under the same or similar circumstances or conditions. It is required to
exercise such ordinary care with reference to
the property as an ordinarily prudent person,
engaged in the same business would have exercised under similar circumstances and conditions.''
We thus see that in the trial court appellant
urged th'at the duty incumbent upon it as regards
the aircraft was that of ordinary care. For the first
time on appeal, appellant claims that it is liable only
for gross negligence. Appellant, however, is bound
by its theory and instruction of ordinary negligence
'adopted by the trial court. See Pettingiall vs. Perkins, 2'7'7 P. 2d 185 (Utah).
14
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POINT III.
THE COURT CORRECTLY INSTRUCTED THE
JURY AS TO THE RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF THE PARTIES AND THE LAW ~PPLICABLE TO THE CASE.

Appellant in Point III 'Of its argument attacks
the lower court's instruction No. 6. This instruction reads:
"If you find from the evidence in this case
that the relationship between Brimhall and
the Thompson Flying Service was that of
bailment and, if you further find that 'Brimhall's airplane was damaged as a result of
a fire while it was in the possession of the defendant you may infer from that fact the defendant was negligent and that his negligence
was the proximate cause of the damage to the
airplane. Such an inference does not amount
to a preponderance of the evidence but you
may use such inference as a basis for finding
by a preponderance of the evidence that the
defendant was negligent."
This instruction embodies the principle that in
a case of bailment where the bailed property is damaged while in possession of the bailee, a presumption of law arises that the bailee was negligent.
Where the bailee offers evidence of his freedom
from negligence, the presumption disappears, but
the inference of negligence remains to be determined
by the jury together with all other evidence. Where,
'as in the case at bar, the bailee offered no evidence
of its freedom from negligence, the bailor is entitled to a directed verdict.
15
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Wyatt v. Baughman, 2'39 P. 2d 193 (Utah)
Romney v. Covey Garage, 111 P. 2d 54'5
fUtah)
Thus, in the Wyatt case, supra, the court said:
"From the foregoing analysis of the terms
'presumption' and 'inference', it must be apparent that what we referred to in the above
quotation from the Sumsion case as a 'presumption', prior to introduction of evidence
to contradict it, is truly a rebuttable 'presumption of law'. It is sufficient in the absence
of evidence negativing negligence to warrant
a directed verdict for the plaintiff, when the
bailment and loss, damage or destruction of
the bailed property is established. But the presumptive element of the assumption disappears from the case upon presentation of some
contravening evidence. The 'inference', however, which was inherently part and parcel
of the 'presumption of law', continues in the
case after the presumption of law itself has
.
d, . . . "
d1sappeare
Appellant then argues that the instruction is
not applicable because if appellant was a bailee at
all, it was gratuitous bailee and liable for only gross
negligence, and that gross negligence cannot be inferred. We are given no authority for this proposition and the general law seems to be to the contrary.
6 Am. Jur. Bailments, Sec. 364. "'Generally
no distinction has been made in the cases in
regard to presumption of negligence or burden of proof, whether the bailment was for
mutual benefit or for the sole benefit of the
bailor or of the bailee, the only difference be16
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ing in the degree of care required; and properly no distinction should be made in these
classes, the question on whom lies the burden
to prove care or negligence being apparently
unaffected by the degree of care or negligence
which must be proved."
Appellant's argument is further met by reference to the facts and theory of defense. First, we see
the basic agreement between the parties for storage
of the ~aircraft for the sum of $30.00 per month.
Second, is appellant's claim for stor1age up to and
including the time of the fire. Third, destruction of
the aircraft while in appellant's exclusive possession.
Fourth, appellant's theory and instruction that it
owed the aircraft owner the duty of ordinary care.
These facts and appellant's admission as to its
duty of ordinary care clearly show a ~compensated
bailment and bring the ~ase squarely within the
rule of the Wyatt case, supra. 'The giving of 'an instruction relative to the inference of negligence as
embodied in the court's instruction No. 6 was, therefore, proper.

17

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

CONCLUSION
Respondent proved a bailment and loss of the
bailed property. It was then incumbent upon appellant to offer evidence that it wrus free from negligence. No such evidence was produced by appellant
and respondent was, therefore, entitled to judgment
as a matter of law. The jury verdict reaching the
same result is, therefore, valid.
Respectfully submitted,
HANSON & GARRETT
Attorneys for
Plaintiff and Respondent

18
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